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1. Introduction
Since Becker (1960), a lot of theoretical papers studied the issue of endogenous fertility.
The basic idea is simple: the rise in the number of children diminishes the parent’s
consumption through rearing costs and its utility but increases the utility of having
children. At the optimum, the two “marginal” effects cancel each other. Reformulat-
ing the theory of fertility, Becker and Barro (1988) assumed that it is the utility of
the offsprings rather than their mere number that enters the parent’s utility function
calculated the impact of interest rate, social security etc. on fertility. Other papers
considered the positive impact of child allowances on endogenous fertility. (Allowances
include everything: from cash transfers through tax credits to free schooling.) Some
studies also analyzed the interaction of public pension (and private saving) and child
allowances in connection with fertility (e.g. Groezen, Leers and Meijdam (2003), for
short, GLM). In the simplest setting, the appropriate increase in fertility through child
allowances raises the pension benefits, while the introduction of fertility-related pensions
can also raise fertility. Note that somewhat surprisingly, the role of the heterogeneity of
fertility has mostly been neglected.
Studying a model with general rather than logarithmic utility function, Cremer,
Gahvari, and Pestieau (2008) also took into account that the government has no in-
formation on cost differences. Applying the methods of mechanism design, they also
analyzed the problems of moral hazard (when parents have no full control over their
fertility) and of adverse selection (when low-cost type pretend to be high-cost type).
They found that under adverse selection, “linking benefits to fertility penalizes high-
cost individuals” and this is undesirable.
In order to simplify the analysis while stressing the role of heterogeneity, in the
present paper we leave aside the old-age problem, moral hazard and adverse selection.
Considering heterogeneity with lower and higher rearing cost types, however, it be-
comes clear that the positive impact on average fertility is accompanied with a negative
one: polarization of fertility. (In a twin paper, Simonovits (2013) studied the problem
including old-age consumption, saving and pension.)
In our model, there are two types with different rearing costs, and the tax system
transfers resources from the higher cost (and lower fertility) type to the lower cost (and
higher fertility) type through child allowances. The government sets the tax rate to
maximize a paternalistic social welfare function, which sets higher value to children
than the parents do. Taking the average rearing cost per child as given, the more
heterogeneous the population, probably the lower the socially optimal tax rate and the
higher the net transfer. Therefore the system diminishes the high-cost type’s endogenous
fertility with respect to the case when they lived alone: polarization. We call the
reader’s attention to our model’s limitations: sterility is neglected, the labor supply is
fixed (see Fenge and Meier, 2009 for flexible labor supply) and differences in the utility
functions, especially in the parameter of relative utility of child are glossed over (for
heterogeneous preferences, see Simonovits, 2013). We emphasize again that—like in
most but not all models—in our simplistic model, the type-specific per child cost is
given. Wage heterogeneity and the role of social norms are also neglected. Taking into
account these complications presumably would not change the qualitative message of
the paper: beware of heterogeneity and polarization!
This type of fertility polarization has already been discussed in the sociological
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literature by Hakim (2003, p. 367), supporting rather than opposing polarization: “The
government ... should focus instead on policies to support home-centered women, who
have the highest fertility rates and can most easily be persuaded to increase their family
size”. (By the way, she stressed the increasing role of women in deciding on fertility
since the spread of contraceptives and derides male demographers underestimating this
change.)
2. Model
We start from the seminal paper by GLM (as reformulated in Simonovits (2013)), but
leaving out old-age consumption and public pension (and saving), rather we concentrate
on the interaction of family allowances and endogenous heterogeneous fertility. There
is a single-sex population, where adults give birth to children and pay taxes to finance
family allowances.
It is assumed that every adult has the same pre-tax income, normalized to 1. We
distinguish two types by their costs of rearing a child, pi, i = 1, 2, p1 > p2 > 0. (As
an extreme case, we shall also consider p1 = p2.) Everybody can choose her fertility.
Denote ni the type-dependent number of children, or equivalently, fertility, and then
the total cost of rearing ni children is assumed to be equal to pini. Let us introduce
the per capita child allowance: ϕ > 0, the tax rate which finances the child-allowance:
θ, 0 ≤ θ < 1; all are given reals. Note that in reality, fertility is always an integer or its
half (in our unisex world), but insisting on it would superfluously complicate the model.
To put it another way, both types include a number of subtypes, with different integer
or half integer subfertilities.
By definition, type i’s own consumption is equal to
ci = 1− θ − (pi − ϕ)ni, i = 1, 2. (1)
Assume that type i chooses her fertility to maximize an additive logarithmic utility
function
U(ci, ni) = log ci + γ logni, i = 1, 2, (2)
where γ is the relative individual utility of having children with respect to that of adult
consumption. Inserting (1) into (2) yields the reduced utility function:
u(ni) = log(1− θ − (pi − ϕ)ni) + γ logni, i = 1, 2. (3)
Following GLM (p. 240) we assume that the workers neglect the impact of their
decisions on the tax balance described in (5) below, i.e. they take θ and ϕ as given.
Equating the marginal utility of having “one small unit” more children to zero: u′(ni) =
0 yields the necessary and sufficient condition of individual optimum and the optimal
fertilities as well:
pi − ϕ
1− θ − (pi − ϕ)ni =
γ
ni
, or ni(p1, p2) =
γ(1− θ)
(1 + γ)(pi − ϕ) , i = 1, 2. (4)
Note that n1, n2 > 0 and 0 < p2 < p1 imply 0 < n1 < n2: higher rearing costs imply
lower optimal fertility. (1) provides then the optimal consumption ci(p1, p2).
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For simplicity, we assume that the initial population share of the two types are
50–50. Then the average fertility n and the tax balance are related as follows:
n =
n1 + n2
2
and θ = ϕn. (5)
The two scalar equations in (4) are coupled through the balance of child allowances (5).
What is the socially optimal value of the tax rate? We shall introduce a paternalistic
social welfare function V (θ) a´ la Feldstein (1985), but correct the relative utility of a
child rather than the discount factor. The individual utility coefficient γ of a child
is replaced by another coefficient γ∗, then the socially optimal tax rate can also be
determined:
V (θ) =
1
2
2∑
i=1
[log ci(p1, p2) + γ∗ logni(p1, p2)]→ max .
Though the paternalistic coefficient may be lower than the individual one (like in
present-day China), we shall confine our attention to the other, more relevant case,
when γ∗ ≥ γ.
As a prelude to the general discussion, we shall consider the case of homogeneous
rearing costs.
Example 1. In the homogeneous case, p1 = p2 = p, the optimal fertilities are the
same, the net transfers are zeros, the fertility and the adult consumption equations
become explicit:
n[p] =
γ + θ
(1 + γ)p
and c[p] =
1− θ
1 + γ
.
Note, however, that—at least, in a first-best setting—the tax is totally superfluous here:
the adults simply receive back what they have paid in.
The social welfare function is as follows:
V (θ) = log
1− θ
1 + γ
+γ∗ log
γ + θ
(1 + γ)p
= log(1−θ)−log(1+γ)+γ∗ log(γ+θ)−γ∗ log((1+γ)p).
Condition V ′(θ) = 0 yields the socially optimal tax rate, which is independent of p:
θ∗ =
γ∗ − γ
1 + γ∗
. (6)
Returning to the heterogeneous case, it can be shown that in a large domain in
the (p1, p2)-plane, there are unique solutions to the pair of nonlinear equations (4)–(5).
More precisely,
Lemma 1. a) For θ > 0, the average fertility n is the larger positive root of the
quadratic equation
p1p2n
2 − (θ + δ)(p1 + p2)n+ θ(θ + 2δ) = 0, where δ = (1− θ)γ2(1 + γ) . (7)
b) Then the type-specific optimal fertilities n1(p1, p2) and n2(p1, p2) can be deter-
mined from (4)–(5).
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Remark. In the excluded case of θ = 0, n1(p1, p2) and n2(p1, p2) are those of the
corresponding homogeneous ones:
n[pi] =
γ
(1 + γ)pi
and the average fertility is determined by their average.
Proof. Insert (5b) into (4):
ni =
γ(1− θ)n
(1 + γ)(pin− θ) , i = 1, 2. (8)
Add up (8-1) and (8-2) and divide the sum by 2n:
1 =
γ(1− θ)
2(1 + γ)
[
1
p1n− θ +
1
p2n− θ
]
, where 0 < θ < p2n. (9)
After rearrangement of (9), (7) obtains. The lower root of (7) lies in the interval
θ/p1 < n < θ/p2, to be excluded.
In the forthcoming proofs one can rely on the explicit formula for n derived from (7)
but it is not needed, ‘geometric’ ideas in (9) yield simpler proofs. First we shall prove
the following theorem.
Theorem 1. Fix the tax rate θ > 0. The average fertility of the heterogeneous
population is higher/lower than that of the homogeneous population with higher/lower
rearing cost, while the type-specific fertility is lower/higher:
n1(p1, p2) < n[p1] < n(p1, p2) < n[p2] < n2(p1, p2), where 0 < p2 < p1.
Remark. The best way to understand the situation is to look at the net transfer
received by type i:
ti = ϕni − θ, i = 1, 2.
Obviously, t1 = 0.5ϕ(n1 − n2) = −t2 < 0 < t2.
Proof. From (9).
To highlight the role of heterogeneous costs, fix the average rearing cost: p1+p2 = 2p,
and change the difference between the two rearing costs: i.e. 2pi = p1−p2, i.e. p1 = p+pi
and p2 = p− pi, where pi is called the degree of (cost) heterogeneity. We prove now two
results.
Theorem 2. Fix the tax rate θ > 0 and the average rearing cost p. The average
fertility n(p+ pi, p− pi) is an increasing function of the degree of heterogeneity pi.
Proof. From (7).
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Theorem 3. The higher the tax rate, the higher the average fertility but also the
divergence between the high and the low fertilities.
Proof. From (7).
What happens if the government adjusts the socially optimal tax rate to the varying
heterogeneity?
Conjecture. The higher the degree of heterogeneity pi, the lower the socially opti-
mal tax rate θ(p+pi, p−pi) and the optimal fertility of the less fertile type, n1(p+pi, p−pi).
Remark. This polarization limits the attractiveness of pronatalistic policies,
where the paternalistic parameter is greater than the individual one: γ∗ > γ.
3. Numerical illustrations
Since the formulas do not inform us about the importance of the quantitative effects, we
shall present some numerical experience. Start from the homogeneous case and set the
relative child utility parameter: γ = 0.4, rearing cost: p = 0.4 and no taxation: θ = 0.
Then the optimal fertility is 0.714, well below the stationary case. Experimenting with
the paternalistic coefficient γ∗ = 0.8, yields the socially optimal tax rate: θ∗ = 0.222
[(6)], implying an expanding population with n = 1.111.
Moving to the heterogeneous rearing costs: first we fix them as p1 = 0.48 and
p2 = 0.32 with average rearing cost p = 0.4. To study the impact of the paternalistic
coefficient on the optimum, change γ∗ from 0.4 to 1 step-by-step. To use Theorems 2
and 3, for the time being, we apply the socially optimal tax rate derived for the average
homogeneous population [(6)] to the heterogeneous population as well. For example, in
the last but one line of Table 1, γ∗ = 0.8 yields the homogeneous socially optimal tax
rate θ∗ = 0.222. Then in separated homogeneous populations, the fertilities would be
n[0.48] = 0.926 vs. n[0.32] = 1.389, while in the heterogeneous population, the optimal
fertilities are n1(0.48, 0.32) = 0.754 and n2(0.48, 0.32) = 1.647, polarization.
Table 1. Dependence of fertilities on paternalism: homogeneity vs. heterogeneity
Homogeneous Homogeneous Heterogeneous
Paternalistic optimal f e r t i l i t y
coefficient tax rate Low High Low High
γ∗ θ∗ n[p1] n[p2] n1(p1, p2) n2(p1, p2)
0.4 0.000 0.595 0.893 0.595 0.893
0.6 0.125 0.781 1.172 0.705 1.286
0.8 0.222 0.926 1.389 0.754 1.647
1.0 0.300 1.042 1.563 0.766 1.976
Remark. p = 0.4.
Next we take into account that the socially optimal tax rate in a heterogeneous
population is different from that of the average homogeneous one, according to Con-
jecture, lower. First we repeat the calculations of Table 1 with varying paternalistic
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coefficient. In fact, the higher the paternalistic coefficient, the greater the reduction of
the heterogeneous population’s optimal tax rate from the homogeneous population’s.
For example, in the last row in Table 2, θ(p1, p2) drops from 0.3 to 0.248. Similarly, the
fertilities rise slightly slower with γ∗ than in the homogeneous case.
Table 2. Dependence of optimal tax rate and fertilities on paternalism
Paternalistic Optimal F e r t i l i t y
coefficient tax rate Low High
γ∗ θ(p1, p2) n1(p1, p2) n2(p1, p2)
0.4 0.000 0.595 0.893
0.6 0.113 0.697 1.245
0.8 0.191 0.742 1.525
1.0 0.248 0.760 1.752
Remark. p = 0.4 and pi = 0.08.
Finally we fix γ∗ at 0.8 and let the degree of cost heterogeneity vary. Note that as pi
rises from 0 to 0.12 in Table 3, the socially optimal tax rate drops from 0.222 to 0.171.
As a result, the lower optimal fertility sinks from 1.111 to 0.63 while the higher optimal
fertility jumps from 1.111 to 1.743, lifting the average fertility from 1.111 to 1.187. The
last column shows the rise of the transfer paid by the low fertility type to the other,
from 0 to 0.08.
Table 3. Dependence of optimal tax rate and fertilities on the degree of heterogeneity
Degree of Optimal F e r t i l i t y Transfer
heterogeneity tax rate Low High Average paid
pi θ(p1, p2) n1(p1, p2) n2(p1, p2) n(p1, p2) t(p1, p2)
0.00 0.222 1.111 1.111 1.111 0.000
0.04 0.213 0.903 1.329 1.116 0.041
0.08 0.191 0.742 1.525 1.134 0.066
0.12 0.171 0.630 1.743 1.187 0.080
Remark. γ∗ = 0.8, p = 0.4, p1 = p+ pi and p2 = p− pi.
4. Conclusions
We have analyzed a very simple model of heterogeneous and endogenous fertility. We
have obtained the following results. The presence of child allowances raises the fertility
of the type with lower private rearing cost and diminishes the fertility of the type with
higher rearing cost with respect to a homogeneous population of the given low and high
rearing costs, while increasing the average fertility with respect to the average of two
homogeneous populations. This limits the scope of acceptable family allowance schemes
to raise fertility.
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